For an important family of asymmetric auctions, we show that the seller's expected revenue is higher in the sealed high-bid auction than in the open auction. This is true for any arbitrary numbers of weak and strong buyers. The family has linear equilibrium bidding strategies, and provides a fertile ground for research in asymmetric auctions. We establish many interesting properties of the linear asymmetric auction model. Revenue comparisons for the two auction formats are performed using data observed in U.S. forest timber auctions. By taking realistic parameters fitting the data, and compare the theoretical predictions of the revenues from the two auction formats, we show that the revenue difference is minimal with a fixed number of participants. When the difference in participation is taken into account, the revenue difference predicted by the linear model is quite similar to the empirical results of Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) .
Introduction
The analysis of auctions with identical buyers has been extensively studied. Many of the standard results in such symmetric auctions are often false in asymmetric auctions with different buyers. For example, the well-known revenue equivalence theorem applies mainly to symmetric auctions. In asymmetric auctions, sealed high-bid (first price) auctions and open (second price) auctions usually yield different revenues for the seller. Empirical studies of the different Despite the importance of going beyond the symmetric auctions, the theory of asymmetric auctions is much less developed. Asymmetric auctions have been analyzed in the seminal papers of Maskin and Riley ((2000a,b) and (2003)), as well as in Bajari (1997) , Lebrun (1999) , Pesendorfer (2000) , Brannman and Froeb (2000) , Arozamena and Cantillon (2004), and Cantillon (2004) . It is clear from these important contributions that the equilibrium bidding strategies in asymmetric auctions often do not have close-form solutions. We need to solve a system of differential equations to find out the equilibrium strategy. The solution usually is quite complicated. It is quite difficult to answer important theoretical questions with the complicated equilibrium strategies. Progress in this area is slow and limited, and we need to have a simple benchmark model to perform the analysis.
We provide such a model in this paper. In our model, equilibrium behavior is very simple to understand because it is linear. Buyers's valuation distribution functions are well-known power functions. We derive the main properties of this model. In this asymmetric auction with linear equilibrium strategies, a buyer's bidding strategy depends only on the total "strength" of the opponents. The strength is measured by the power of the cumulative distribution function. Each buyer has a measure of strength, and the strength of a group of buyers is the sum of their measure of strength. When a buyer's strength changes, it changes the opponent's bidding behavior, but not his own. This simplified pattern of interaction makes it easier to understand the properties of the model. Such simplicity is a valuable asset in the analysis asymmetric auctions.
In the asymmetric auction model with linear equilibrium strategies, a buyer with valuation below the maximum valuation of the weak buyer always bids an amount equal to the expected second highest valuation of the losing buyer. This means that the price a buyer pays when he or she wins is the same in both auctions. This property is usually reserved for symmetric auctions, but is true in our model. The difference in expected payment then is due to the difference in winning probabilities. When a strong buyer has valuation higher than the maximum valuation of a weak buyer, we can also show that the strong buyer pays more when he wins in the sealed auction than in the open auction.
To demonstrate the usefulness of this model, we investigate the revenue ranking problem in asymmetric auctions. The classic result in the literature is in Maskin and Riley (2000a) . They are able to rank the sealed high-bid and open auctions only in cases of "first order asymmetry". Specifically, they show that if the strong buyer's valuation distribution is a "shift" or a "stretched" version of the weak buyer's distribution, then the sealed high-bid (first price) auction yields higher revenue to the seller than the open (second price) auction. In our model, valuation distributions are different power functions, and they cannot be transformed in such a simple manner.
We go beyond their results by showing that in our auctions with linear equilibrium bidding strategies, the seller always prefers the sealed auction over the open auction. Furthermore, the result holds for any arbitrary number of buyers with any combination of the strong and weak ones. The analysis of asymmetric auctions with more than two buyers is generally a tough model to analyze. As far as we know, this is the first systematic result of the revenue ranking between the two auction formats in asymmetric auctions with many buyers.
We use the term "weak Getty effect" to explain our result intuitively. "Getty effect" refers to the case in which the strong buyer is so strong that her bid dominates the weak buyer's bid for sure. When there is Getty effect, the sealed auction yields higher revenue to the seller. This is because the strong buyer pays the maximum of the weak buyer's valuation in the sealed auction, but pays the expected value of the weak buyer's valuation in the open auction. The weak Getty effect refers to the case in which the strong buyer is relatively more likely to be in the high range than in the low range. In asymmetric auctions, a weak buyer has higher winning probabilities, hence the seller receives more revenue from the weak buyers in sealed than in open auctions. It is also true that for lower-valued strong buyers, the seller receives higher payment from them in open auctions than in sealed auctions. This delicate balance in broken by the higher-valued strong buyers who tend to pay more in the sealed than open auction. This weak Getty effect results in higher revenue in sealed auctions. A more detailed explanation is presented in section 2 using a simple example with two buyers.
The weak Getty effect is an intuitive but vague statement. The proof of our main ranking result uses a property called "bundling effect". When the weak buyers are merged into one weak buyer with the same total strength, they behave as if there is a collusive block. We call this bundling rather than collusion because the valuation interval of the weak buyer needs to be "stretched" to maintain the linear model after the weak buyers are bundled into one. We show that bundling does not affect the seller's revenue in the sealed high-bid auction, but raises the seller's revenue in the open auction. This bundling effect makes it possible for us to prove the ranking result. A more detailed explanation is provided in the next section through an example.
We perform numerical computations with our linear model using the summary data from the U.S. forest timber auctions in Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) . We want to get a quantitative measure of the size of the revenue gap between sealed high-bid auctions and open auctions using realistic parameters. By choosing parameters of the model to fit the pattern observed in the data, the linear model predicts that the revenue difference between the two auction formats is very small (less than 1%) with a fixed number of participants. Since there is a difference in participation by buyers, with weak buyers preferring sealed highbid auctions, we also consider the effect of such difference in participation on the revenue. When the participation pattern is taken into account, the theoretical prediction of the revenue difference in the linear model is about 14%, which is quite similar to the range obtained by Athey Levin and Seira (2004) in their empirical analysis with a more complicated specification 1 . Our model adds more families of auctions in which the sealed auction performs better than the open auction in revenues. Graham and Marshall (1987) considers collusion in asymmetric auctions. Klemperer (1998) considers auctions with almost common values. Each paper points to cases in which the seller's revenues are higher in the sealed auction. Empirical evidence in the timber auctions cited earlier also points to the higher revenues in the sealed high-bid auctions. There are related works on revenue comparisons between symmetric and asymmetric auctions. Cantillon (2001) argues that asymmetry reduces the seller's revenue when compared with a symmetric auction with the same social surplus, while Kaplan and Zamir (2002) make the comparisons under different beliefs (or information structure).
Section two gives a simple summary of the important properties of the linear asymmetric auction model. Section three states proves these properties formally.
In section four, we show that the sealed auction yields higher expected revenue for the seller than the open auction. In section five, some numerical computations are performed using typical data observed in timber auctions. Section six provides some conclusions.
Main Properties
We shall illustrate the main properties of the linear asymmetric auctions here. In the first example, we show that the equilibrium bidding strategy of a buyer in the sealed auction depends on the strength of the opponent, not on the opponent's strategy, or his own strength.
Example 1 There is one weak buyer and one strong buyer. Let the weak buyer's c.d.f. of the valuation be F 1 (v) = 
Note that if the valuation interval of the weak buyer were [0,
1 2 ], and F 1 (v) = 2v, then we don't have linear equilibrium strategies. Assume that the strength (the exponent 2 in the power function v 2 ) of the strong buyer is now changed to 3
To maintain the linear property of the model, we need to take a = 9 8 . In this new auction, the equilibrium strategies are
The chosen value for a insures that the highest bids of the two buyers are the same and both are equal to
Subject to the maintenance of the linear equilibrium strategies, we see that the equilibrium strategy of the weak buyer is now more aggressive (closer to the true valuation) because of the increased strength of the stronger buyer, but the equilibrium strategy of the strong buyer remains the same as before, because the strength of the weak buyer is unchanged. Notice also that the strategy of the weak buyer has changed, but this does not affect the strategy of the strong buyer.
The property illustrated by example 1 holds when there are many weak and strong buyers. A buyer's equilibrium bidding strategy depends only on the total strength of all the other buyers (the sum of all the exponents), and not on his or her own strength.
We shall now illustrate the second important property of our model. A buyer with valuation less than the maximum valuation of the weak buyer pays the same (expected) price as a winner in both the sealed and open auctions. We shall refer to this price as the winner's price (payment conditional on winning). This property holds in symmetric auctions, but is generally false in asymmetric auctions. It is true in our linear asymmetric model, and plays an important role in our analysis and computations of the revenues. The expected payment in equilibrium of a buyer with valuation v is his or her winning probability times the winner's price. Hence in our model, the difference of the expected payment in the sealed and open auctions is explained by the difference in winning probabilities as the winner's price is the same in both auctions.
Example 2 Take the same example we considered in example 1 with one weak buyer and one strong buyer and
. Take any weak buyer with v ≤ 3 4 . In the sealed auction, the equilibrium bid is 2 3 v, and the winner's price is not stochastic and is equal to the bid 2 3 v. In the open auction, the equilibrium bid is v, and the winning probability is F 2 (v) = v 2 . The winner's price is stochastic, with the expected price
which is the same the winner's price in the sealed auction. The same property can be shown in the same way for a strong buyer with v ≤ 3 4 . For the strong buyer with v > 3 4 , the winning probability is 1 in the open auction, and the payment is the same as the strong buyer with valuation 3 4 . In the sealed auction, the winner's price is higher than that of the strong buyer with valuation 3 4 . Hence the winner's price is higher in the sealed auction than in the open auction. However, the winning probability in the sealed auction is less than one.
Weak Getty Effects
We now use the second property to give an intuitive explanation of the superiority of the sealed auction over the open auction for the seller's revenue. This is only an intuitive explanation using the concept of "weak" Getty effects. A more rigorous explanation will be offered through the bundling effect immediately afterwards.
Take the buyers we considered in example 1 with one weak buyer and one strong buyer and
We have the following equilibrium bidding strategies in the sealed auction
be the equilibrium winning probabilities of buyer i ∈ {1, 2} in the sealed high-bid auction and the open auction respectively. We have
It is clear that the weak buyer has higher winning probabilities in the sealed auction than in the open auction, while the reverse is true for the strong buyer. The payments in both auctions for the buyer as a winner are The weak buyer's expected payment to the seller in the sealed auction is
For easier comparisons with the open auction, we shall change the variable from the valuation variable v to the payment variable p = 2 3 v. The integral after the change of variable is written as
In the open auction, the weak buyer's expected payment to the seller can be written as
We can change to the (expected) payment variable p = 2 3 v as well, and it becomes
We now compare the weak buyer's payment in the two auctions. Since the strong buyer shades his bid more than the weak buyer, we must have (1) and (2), we know that the weak buyer's payment to the seller must be higher in the sealed auction than in the open auction. The difference is 0.125 − 0.070313 = 0.05 468 7.
Similarly, the strong buyer's expected payment to the seller in the sealed auction is written as
In the open auction, the strong buyer's expected payment to the seller is
A strong buyer with valuation v ∈ [ When we change to the payment variable p =
We can compare (5) to (3) rewritten as
Note that q *
, and therefore the first integral in (5) is larger than the first integral in (6). The second expression in (5) can be easily dominated by the second integral in (6) if the probability that the strong buyer has valuation higher than 3 4 is large enough. We can compute their values as 3 8
(1 − F 2 ( 3 4 )) = 3 8 (1 − 9 16 ) = 0.164 06
Hence in our example, the second integral of (6) is indeed slightly larger 2 than the second expression of (5). We also compute the values of the first integrals as follows
3 dp = 4( 3 This amount is dominated by the difference for the weak buyers 0.05 468 7. Therefore in our example, the seller has higher revenue in the sealed auction than in the open auction.
The superiority of the sealed auction in our model is explained by two factors: (1) The higher payment by the higher-valued stronger buyer in the sealed auction than in the open auction which offsets the higher revenue from the lower-valued strong buyer in the open auction; (2) The strong buyer has a high probability of being in the higher end of the valuation interval. This causes the weak buyer's payment dominant in the comparison between revenues.
This explanation has connections to the Getty Effect. The Getty effect in Maskin and Riley (2000a) refers to a situation in which the strong buyer's valuation is so strong that his bid dominates that of the weak buyer with certainty. We shall use the term "strong Getty effect" to refer to a situation in which the strong buyer's bid dominates that of the weak buyer with probability close to 1. The strong Getty effect occurs when the c.d.f of the strong buyer has a higher power meaning F 2 (v) = v n , n → ∞ rather than v 2 . When this is true, the strong buyer's payment to the seller will be higher in the sealed auction. If the strong buyer's valuation is very likely to be above the maximum valuation of the weak buyer, then the strong buyer's payment to the seller in the open auction would not be much larger, if it is larger, than his payment in the sealed auction. we loosely refer to this as the weak Getty effect.
The Bundling Effect
An important property called the "bundling effect" is a central component of our analysis and the key to the proof of our main result. We shall now illustrate the bundling effect with an example.
Assume that there are n weak buyers each with a cumulative valuation distribution F 1 (v) = 
with the equilibrium strategies
for the weak and strong buyers respectively. For example, let n = 2, r = 1, then (7) says that we must have c = . The strong buyer's bidding behavior depends only on the total strength of the weak buyers nr = 2. Assume that the two weak buyers are bundled into one weak buyer with the same total strength 2. We have just seen that c becomes larger by bundling. The new distribution for the weak buyer after bundling is
15 . Before bundling, the equilibrium strategy of a weak buyer is
After bundling, the weak buyer's equilibrium strategy becomes
The equilibrium strategy of the strong buyer is not affected and is b 2 (v) = 2 3 v before and after bundling.
We now consider the effects of bundling on the seller's revenue. First consider the sealed auction. We shall use the payment variable p to express the seller's revenue integral. Note that the payment range for p is the same before and after bundling. The seller's revenue from the weak buyers before bundling is given by
After bundling, the seller's revenue from the single weak buyer is
hence the revenue from the weak buyer after bundling is the same as the total revenue from all the weak buyers before bundling. The seller's revenue from the strong buyer is not affected by bundling either. This is because the strong buyer's bids are not affected by bundling, and the winning probability from the bid b is
2 which is not affected by bundling. Hence there is no change in the winning probability. We can therefore conclude that the seller's revenue in the sealed auction is not affected by the bundling. This is a general property, and can be easily proved after we derive the seller's revenue formula in sealed auctions in Theorem 11. For the open auction, bundling has a different effect. Using the (expected) payment variable p, the seller's revenue from the weak buyers is 
Bundling and Revenue Ranking
To show the implications of the bundling effects on revenue ranking between the sealed and open auctions, consider the following variation of the example in the last section. There are five weak buyers n = 5 and one strong buyer. The strong buyer has the same valuation distribution in the last section. Assume that r = 2 so that the total strength of the weak buyers is nr = 10. When we bundle all five weak buyers into one with the strength 10, the auction becomes a symmetric one with two identical buyers. In this new auction, the revenue equivalence theorem says that the seller's revenue from the sealed and open auctions are the same. Since bundling increases the seller's revenue in the open auction, and does not affect the seller's revenue in the sealed auction, we conclude that the seller's revenue from the sealed auction must be higher than that from the open auction before bundling. Hence in this example, bundling effects allow us to show that the sealed auction is better than the open one in the original asymmetric auction.
Consider now the auction with six weak buyers instead. In other words, assume that n = 6, while other things are kept the same as before. The total strength of the weak buyers is now nr = 12 which is higher than the strength of the strong buyer 10. We cannot bundle the six weak buyers into one, and apply the bundling effect, as the bundling effect only applies when the merged buyer is weaker than the strong buyer. However, we can take r = 10, n = 1.2. The fractional number of weak buyers n = 1.2 can be interpreted this way. There are two identical weak buyers each with r = 10. One of them only shows up in the auction with probability 0.2. In other words, we can allow probabilistic participation of the weak buyers. After bundling, all buyers are the same and there are 2.2 of them. In this symmetric auction, the revenue equivalence theorem applies, and combined with the bundling effects, we can conclude that the sealed auction is better than the open auction in the original asymmetric auction.
When we have n = 2, r = 1, the total strength of the weak buyers is less than the strength of the strong buyer. We can bundle the weak buyers into a fractional number of buyers with n = 0.2, r = 10, meaning that the weak buyer participates with probability 0.2. Bundling effect will then apply, and we get the same conclusion on the ranking of the sealed and open asymmetric auctions.
After we derive the formulas for the seller's revenues later, the revenue ranking result we want to show becomes a mathematical inequality. These inequalities make sense when n takes on real numbers rather than integers. Therefore, the model with probabilistic participation need not be used in the rigorous proof. It is however a good motivation for the inequalities we will show later.
The Model
We assume that the auction is a standard private valuation auction with a single object for sale. The buyer' valuation for the object is independent of each other.
There are two kinds of buyers: weak and strong ones. Let n 1 be the number of weak buyers and n 2 the number of strong buyers. Each buyer has a valuation distributed according to a power function over some interval. For simplicity, assume that the seller has no value for the single object for sale.
Let r 1 > 0, r 2 > 0 be two numbers with r 1 < r 2 . Let the c.d.f. of the valuation of the weak buyer 
Hence F 2 first-order stochastically dominates F 1 . It is also easy to see that the condition of conditional stochastic dominance is also satisfied. This is shown in the following lemma.
Lemma 3 The conditional first-order stochastic dominance of F 2 over F 1 holds.
Proof. Letṽ 1 ,ṽ 2 be the random variables for the valuation distributions of the weak and strong buyers respectively. For all 0 < x < y ≤ c 1 , we have
For 0 < x ≤ c 1 < y < c 2 , we have
For all 0 < c 1 < x < y < c 2 , we have
The inequality is satisfied for all possible ranges of x and y. Therefore the conditional stochastic dominance condition is satisfied.
In our model, the strength of a buyer is represented by the powers r 1 , r 2 . The higher the power, the stronger the buyer is. A strong buyer also has a larger support of the valuation distribution. It will turn out that the equilibrium strategy of each buyer is linear. When a buyer faces many other buyers each with a power function distribution, it is as if the buyer is facing a single buyer with a power function distribution under the assumption of independent private valuation. Moreover, the strength of all the opponents can be summed up by a single number which is the sum of all the powers of the opposing buyers. Let
be the strength of all the opponents of a strong buyer, and
be the strength of all the opponents of a weak buyer. We have
, we must have
, and m = r * 2 (r * 1 + 1) r * 1 (r * 2 + 1)
For weak and strong buyers, the usual assumption is c 1 ≤ c 2 . We further assume that c 1 = mc 2 < c 2 . This is necessary to preserve the structure of linear equilibrium bidding strategies in the sealed auction in our model. Note that in the two-buyer case, we have r * 1 = r 2 , r * 2 = r 1 .
Let b i (v), i ∈ {1, 2} denote the equilibrium bidding strategies of the buyers in the sealed high-bid (or first price) auction. We will show that the following pair of bidding strategies
is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proposition 4
The pair of strategies in (12) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in the sealed auction.
Proof. When a weak buyer with valuation v bids x, the winning probability is
(r * 1 c 1 ) (n 1 −1)r 1 (r * 2 c 2 ) n 2 r 2 Hence the profit function is
The first order condition can be written as
If r * 1 > 1, the profit function is not a concave function of x. However, it is still true that the first order condition is sufficient for a bid x to be optimal. The reason is that the derivative of g(
and the second derivative is given by
The second derivative becomes positive when x < Remark 5 It appears that the equilibrium strategy in Proposition 4 is the only one possible. Existing theorems on the uniqueness of equilibrium (Maskin (2003) , Lebrun (1999) ) do not seem to cover our case here because the weak buyers and the strong buyers have different supports in their valuation distributions, and the density at 0 is zero. Modified arguments from the existing literature may be sufficient to yield uniqueness.
Because of the importance of the winning probabilities, we have the following simple lemma for later applications. Let q i (v), q * i (v) be the equilibrium winning probabilities of buyer i in the sealed and open auctions respectively.
Lemma 6
The equilibrium winning probabilities of the buyers with valuation v in the sealed auction are given by
In the open auction, they are given by
Proof.
In the sealed auction, the equilibrium winning probability of a weak buyer is
and for a strong buyer, it is
In the open auction, a strong buyer with v ≤ c 1 wins with probability
and a weak buyer wins with probability
For a strong buyer with v > c, the winning probability is
We have the following simple result on the allocation of the good for sale in the sealed high-bid auction. These will prove useful in fitting our model to the forest timber auctions later.
Proposition 7
The equilibrium winning probabilities are r 1 n 1 r 1 +n 2 r 2 , r 2 n 1 r 1 +n 2 r 2 for a weak and strong buyer respectively in the sealed high-bid auction. The probability that a winner is a weak buyer is given by n 1 r 1 n 1 r 1 + n 2 r 2 Proof. Using lemma 6, the winning probability of a weak buyer is
Similarly, it is r 2 n 1 r 1 + n 2 r 2 for a strong buyer. The probability that a weak buyer wins is then equal to
We also use the following simple result on the comparisons of the average bids of the weak and strong buyers in fitting our model to the data later.
Lemma 8
The average equilibrium bid of a buyer i = 1, 2 in the sealed high-bid auction is r * i c i r * i + 1 r i r i + 1 hence the ratio of the average bid of the strong and weak buyers is r 2 r 2 + 1
Proof. We compute the equilibrium average bid of a weak buyer as follows
Similarly, we can derive the result of the strong buyer in the same way. Since r * i c i r * i +1 is independent of i, we have (18).
Another interesting property of our model is that in equilibrium a buyer with valuation v ≤ c 1 pays the same expected price as a winner in both sealed and open auctions. This is a property we usually find in a symmetric auction with identical buyers. In our asymmetric auctions, it happens to be true as well. This property simplifies our analysis of the comparisons between the revenues from the two auctions. A strong buyer with valuation v > c 1 pays more in the sealed auction than in the open auction when he wins. The interim payment is a constant plus the interim payment in an auction (sealed or open) with only the strong buyers. This is shown in the following proposition. 
and the interim payment is
Proof. To compute the winner's expected payment in the open auction, first consider the case v ≤ c 1 . Conditional on winning, his (or her) probability of paying a price p is the conditional probability of all opponents bidding lower than p, and is given by 1 q * 2 (v)
From lemma 6, we have
hence the expected price to pay is given by
which is exactly the equilibrium bid of the strong buyer in the sealed auction. Similarly, we prove the same result for a weak buyer. For a strong buyer with valuation v > c 1 , the winning probability is
The probability of paying a price p conditional on winning is
and the expected price to pay is
Note that the first term in (20) is the payment in an auction with only the strong buyers. The second term in (20) gives us the interim payment
The payment of a winning strong buyer in a sealed auction is the equilibrium bid r * 2
Hence in equilibrium, a winning strong buyer with v > c 1 pays more in the sealed auction than in the open auction.
We are now ready to compare the revenues from the two auctions. It is useful to look at the virtual values of the buyers. In Maskin and Riley (2000a) , the virtual values of the buyers are used to compare the seller's revenues in the two auctions. The virtual values represent the marginal revenues for the seller in assigning the winner of an auction. For our family of distributions, the stronger the buyer is, the smaller the virtual value for a fixed v. This is stated in the following. Unfortunately, in the theory developed by Maskin and Riley (2000a) Proof. The virtual values are given by
hence it is decreasing in k. Let us now fix k, and consider the relationship between the virtual value and r. We want to show that J(v) is strictly decreasing in r on the interval 0 < v < k. We need to show for all r < s, we have
or
Multiply both sides of (22) by rsv s−1 , we have
which is in fact an equality. The derivatives of the left-hand and right-hand sides of (23) n 1 r 1 + n 2 r 2 n 1 r 1 + n 2 r 2 + 1 with r * 2 = n 1 r 1 +(n 2 − 1)r 2 . Therefore n 1 always appears jointly with r 1 in n 1 r 1 in the expression for the revenue.
We now compute the seller's revenue in the open auction. Because of different valuation intervals of the weak and strong buyers, the expression is quite complicated. Simpler formula for the special case with one strong buyer n 2 = 1 is stated as a corollary, and will be used for computations later.
Proof. When there is only one strong buyer, we have n 2 = 1, and r * 1 = (n 1 − 1)r 1 + r 2 , r * 2 = n 1 r 1 R = r * 2 r * 2 + 1 − r * 1 r * 1 + 1 n 1 r 1 n 1 r 1 + r 2 + 1 − r * 2 r * 2 + 1 r 2 n 1 r 1 + r 2 + 1 = r * 2 r * 2 + 1
2 ) (r * 1 + 1)(r * 2 + 1)(n 1 r 1 + r 2 + 1) = n 1 r 1 (r * 1 + 1)(n 1 r 1 + r 2 + 1) Hence the seller's revenue is
µ n 1 r 1 ((n 1 − 1)r 1 + r 2 + 1)(n 1 r 1 + r 2 + 1) ¶
The Ranking
We now provide a general result on the ranking of the sealed auction and the open auction for our linear asymmetric auction models with strong and weak buyers and any arbitrary numbers of them in the bidding. The sealed auction raises higher revenue for the seller.
Theorem 15 With any combination of weak and strong buyers in the linear asymmetric auction, the seller's revenue is higher in the sealed high-bid auction than in the open auction.
Before we present the general proof, it is of interest to look at the special case when there is only one strong buyer and any number of weak buyers. There is a direct specialized proof in this case using an inequality which may be useful in the future applications of the model. This proof was initially discovered for the case with one weak buyer, and one strong buyer, and later generalized to the case with many weak buyers. When there is more than one strong buyer, the revenue formula becomes very complicated, and a new proof using the idea of the bundling effect becomes necessary.
The specialized proof makes use of the following lemma.
Lemma 16 For all x > 1, we have
The increasing property of RV o in m then implies that
and our proof is complete.
Applications to Forest Timber Auctions
We shall use our model to compare the revenue differences between sealed and open auctions. We take the typical data that we observe in the timber auctions, using the tables in Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) as a reference.
The U.S. Forest Service timber program provides an excellent test case for comparisons in revenues as it has historically used both open and sealed auctions, at times even randomizing the choice. There are two kinds of participants in Forest Service timber auctions. One type is the individually-owned logging companies, called loggers. The second type is the large vertically integrated forest products conglomerates, called mills. Loggers are weak buyers, while mills are strong buyers. Mills, who have manufacturing capacity, tend to have higher values for a given contract than loggers, who have to re-sell the timber.
For a selected sample, the average numbers of logger and mill bidders are 3.42 and 1.14 respectively in the sealed sealed auctions. In the open auctions, they are 2.84 and 1.40 respectively. Hence there are more logger bidders in the sealed bid auctions and more mill bidders in the open auctions. Another important difference between the two types of auctions in the sample is the track size. The average open auction has an estimated 2893 mbf (thousand board feet) of timber, while the average sealed bid sale has only 1502 mbf. These differences in track size and the composition of weak and strong buyers may cause revenue differences which need to be separated from the effects of the auction formats. Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) found that for a fixed set of participants, their calibrated model predicts relatively small discrepancies between sealed bid auctions and open auctions. Sealed bid auctions raise more revenue, but the effects are small (less than 1%).
We shall apply our linear model to predict the revenue difference between the two auction formats. Before performing any comparisons, we need to determine the parameters r 1 , r 2 . We adopt two criteria in determining these parameters. First we want the winning probabilities of the loggers to be consistent with the data. This winning probability is 0.69 in table 1.A for Northern forest sealed bid auctions in Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) . Secondly, we want the ratio of the average mill bids and logger bids to be consistent with the data. Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) estimated that the mill bids are 24% higher than the logger bids on average, conditional on the sale characteristics such as tract size. We choose these two criteria for the simplicity of computations.
In the sealed high-bid auctions, we assume that there are three logger bidders and one mill bidder. By Proposition 7, the probability that the winner is a logger is n 1 r 1 n 1 r 1 + n 2 r 2 = 3r 1 3r 1 + r 2
Hence we have the first condition
and we have r 1 = 0.69 0.93
The second condition says that the average mill bids are 24% higher than the average logger bids. By lemma 8, we have the condition r 2 r 2 + 1 = 1.24
From (43) and (44) We now consider the possible effect of entry pattern on the revenue difference between the two formats. The findings in Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) say that mill entry in both auction formats is roughly the same in the Northern forest region, but there is more entry by loggers in the sealed auctions. They measured the revenue difference to be in the range of 12-18% higher in sealed auctions than in open auctions. We now want to compare these results with the theoretical predictions of the linear model.
In this comparison, we use the same r 1 , r 2 above. First assume that the number of loggers is reduced to 2 in the open auction, and there is still one mill bidder. We assume that c 1 remains the same with some downward adjustment for c 2 to maintain the linear model. We have higher in sealed high-bid auctions.
The average increase of the loggers in the sealed-bid auction in the Northern forest region is about 0.5. If we allow for fractional numbers of loggers, and take n 1 = 2.5, we have higher in the sealed high-bid auction. This is also quite consistent with the result of Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) with participation decisions.
6 Conclusion Maskin and Riley (2000a) suggests one reason to explain why the art auctions are often conducted openly rather than in sealed bids. A buyer with high valuation may think that he or she is quite unique in such tastes, and may think that others' valuation may be quite low. In sealed high-bid auctions, lowballing may be a good strategy in such environments. The open auction is a format that may safeguard again such a strategy. The Proposition 4.5 in their paper supporting for such a result assumes that the weak buyer's valuation has a concentration on the very low end of the interval.
Our result suggests another important consideration for choosing between the sealed high-bid and open auctions. Assume that the strong buyer is likely to be on the high end of the valuation interval. In a sealed high-bid auction, it may encourage him or her to bid aggressively and outbid the other buyers so that a win is guaranteed. This is the Getty effect we discussed earlier. In an open auction, Mr. Getty may just sit out the bidding process comfortably and coasting to the end to pay the second highest price without much effort on his part. This will allow him to pay only the expected second highest price in an open auction. Hence in an auction with high probability of the weak buyer's low valuation, low-balling is an important consideration, and an open auction is better; while in an auction with high probability of the strong buyers's high valuation, Getty effect is an important consideration, and the sealed high-bid auction is better. Athey, Levin and Seira (2004) provides evidence that collusion is perhaps a primary factor that may cause substantial revenue gaps between the two auction formats. We have not explored this issue here. There is also a great potential for using the linear model in empirical studies. The linear equilibrium auction model provided here enhances our understanding of the different benefits in the choice between the sealed high-bid and open auctions. It is also hoped that it is useful in providing a simple model for theoretical investigations as well as empirical estimation, testing, and experiments.
